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NOTES
LAND USE REGULATION AS A "TAKING" OF
PROPERTY: PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
PART I
INTRODUCTION
Under current law, a landowner can be restricted from altering a
building if the proposed alteration would conflict with an ordinance
protecting the site as "historic."' A local regulation can restrict or re-
duce allowable building density for purposes of open space preserva-
tion.2 An owner can also be prevented from filling a wetland, in order
to preserve its natural character and the benefits that are received by
the public from its preservation.3 These restrictions and numerous
other local, state, or federal regulations can result in considerable
financial loss to the landowner. The fifth and fourteenth amendments
protect individuals from a taking of private property for a public pur-
pose without just compensation.4
The relationship between the "taking clause" of the Constitution
and excessive regulatory action formed the basis of questions recently
presented to the Supreme Court in San Diego Gas & Electric Company
v. City of San Diego.5 Specifically, the Court was asked to rule "that a
State must provide a monetary remedy to a landowner whose property
allegedly has been 'taken' by a regulatory ordinance" in violation of
the fifth amendment.6 The trial court had awarded three million dol-
lars to the electric company for land which was given an "open space"
designation in the city's general plan.7 The court found that the
1. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Penn Central
Terminal was designated an historic site. The law restricted future development of the prop-
erty. The owner sued the city, claiming the operation of the ordinance effected a fifth
amendment taking of his property. The court upheld the ordinance where the owner was
permitted a "reasonable beneficial use" of the property. Id. at 138. See discussion in text
accompanying notes 80-85 infra.
2. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 225 (1980); Rogin v. Bensalem Township, 616 F.2d
680 (3d Cir. 1980). In both cases residential dwelling density was "downzoned" to a less
dense classification.
3. See Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972); this is the rule in Wis-
consin. But cf. State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970) (application of restrictions in state
statute which stopped appellant's proposal to fill wetland and denied owner a commercial
use of the land was held to be equivalent to a taking of the property).
4. The fifth amendment provides "nor shall private property be ten for public use, without
just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. In addition, the just compensation clause ap-
plies to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Webb's
Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 101 S. Ct. 446 (1980).
5. 101 S. Ct. 1287 (1981).
6. Id. at 1289.
7. See note 63 i/fa.
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designation deprived the plaintiff of the practical use of its property
and constituted an unconstitutional taking of the property.8 Upon re-
consideration, the court of appeals ruled that administrative manda-
mus, not compensation, is the plaintiffs remedy when excessive or
arbitrary regulation results in a taking of his property.9
The Supreme Court did not answer the compensation question in
San Diego. Instead, it dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. I0 The
compensation question was addressed in a dissenting opinion drafted
by Justice Brennan, however. Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Powell
joined in the dissent, and Justice Rehnquist, in a concurring opinion,
expressed agreement with the dissent's approach to the taking question.
Curiously, in their attempt to set forth the law, the five Justices have
characterized the taking question as one which is separate from a sub-
stantive due process question. " The dissent argues that "the Constitu-
tion demands that a government entity pay just compensation" if a
regulatory taking occurs. 12
The California court of appeals in San Diego followed an earlier
California Supreme Court opinion, Agins v. City of Tiburon, in which
that court held that a similar deprivation is not compensable and that
the injured landowner's remedy is mandamus. 13 The Supreme Court
dissent in San Diego rejected the California view, characterizing it as
holding that a city's exercise of its police power "could not as a matter
of federal constitutional law constitute a 'taking' under the Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendments".' 4
This note will adopt the terminology of cases which preceded San
Diego and give the label "a taking" to the point at which overzealous
regulation goes "too far" in its effect on the beneficial use and value of
land. It will define a test which may be legislatively or judicially ad-
ministered. The test will determine at what point a taking occurs and
what remedies are available to the landowner, including monetary
compensation, mandamus, or a combination of these. In certain re-
spects this standard will parallel a test which was set forth in the San
Diego dissent. This note will propose that a monetary remedy be per-
mitted to the extent that a taking has occurred. The monetary remedy
should be applied, however, only if the taking is "irreversible." Where
invalidation of an ordinance would reverse the harm or render the tak-
ing temporary, the proposed method would permit the court to invali-
8. See note 66 infra.
9. See note 64-66 infra.
10. The California Supreme Court opinion, which vacated the court of appeals judgment and
transferred the case to that court for reconsideration, was not a final judgment for purposes
of 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976). San Diego, 101 S. Ct. at 1288.
I1. Id. at 1296 (J. Brennan, dissenting).
12. Id. at 1304.
13. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 598 P.2d 25 (1975).
14. San Diego, 101 S. Ct. at 1297.
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date the ordinance and award the minimum monetary award that is
constitutionally required.
Legal Uncertainty
There is no clear judicial method for determining at what point a
land use ordinance is so severe, as specifically applied, that it effects a
taking of private property. 15 Furthermore, neither legislatures nor
courts have provided an appropriate remedy for overzealous regula-
tion. Where regulatory action effects a taking, it is unclear whether a
court can or must award monetary compensation. The dissenting opin-
ion in San Diego suggests that the view of the Supreme Court may
conflict with that of the California court and others who have inter-
preted the law as requiring invalidation of the ordinance in this situa-
tion. 6 Confronted with conflicting interpretations of the law and
constrained by rules which require compensation in an eminent do-
main proceeding in the amount of the "highest and best use,"' 7 a court
may elect to rely upon a presumption that the statute is constitutional.
Thus, an arguably "unfair" statute is upheld. When this happens, the
landowner has no right to even an intermediate level of relief.'
Attempted Reform
In some instances, state legislation provides relief for an individual,
when the value of his property is greatly reduced as a result of a land
use restraint. 19 More sweeping legislative reform has been recom-
15. Under the rule in Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922), the constitutional right is
triggered only when a regulation goes "too far." See note 84 infra. Penn Central, 438 U.S.
104 (1978), and Agins, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), are among the cases which have defined this
limit. See notes I and 2, supra. Various scholars are not satisfied with the rule as it is
applied, however. Michelman, for example, has expressed frustration with judicial attempts
to reduce the "method of reasoning" to doctrinal principles and rules of decision. He recom-
mends a return to 'first princiales." Michelman, Property Utility, and Fairness. Comments on
the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1171, 1172
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Michelman] (emphasis added). The rule that he ultimately rec-
ommends is one of "fairness," based upon John Rawl's theory. Id. at 1172, 1218-24. Van
Alstyne has similarly accused courts of relying upon procedural rules in order to avoid artic-
ulating a substantive test. He has shown concern, also, about the "heavy (factual) burden"
borne by the plaintiff where unconstitutionality is alleged. Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging
by Police Power: The Searchfor Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 13
(1970-1971) [hereinafter cited as Van Alstyne]. What constitutes a taking "depends upon the
circumstances in each case." See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
16. See note 92 infra.
17. See note 39 infra.
18. See Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accommodation Power. Antidotesfor the Taking
Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1021, 1037 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as "Fair" Compensation].
19. For examples of statutes which currently address land use regulation as a "taking," see, e.g.,
R.I. GEN. LAWS, § 2-116 (Supp. 1980). Other legislation is worded in a manner which sets
forth a constitutional threshold for compensation. The purpose is apparently to protect the
legislation from invalidation; its emphasis is not on "fairness" to the landowner. See CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-34, 22a-43a (West Supp. 1980); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 130, § 105
(Michie/Law Co-op Supp. 1980); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 483-A: 1, 483-A:6 (Supp. 1979).
The Connecticut and New Hampshire statutes provide an option of invalidation or compen-
sation. The Massachusetts statute expressly provides for a taking, by eminent domain, of less
280 [Vol. 8:278
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mended by some authors.21 Others have attempted to justify an exten-
tion of the police power without compensation.2 Rejecting an
argument that compensation is due an individual only when the value
of his property is severely diminished, as a result of stringent regula-
tion, these scholars argue that the public possesses greater rights than
were possessed in the past. They argue that regulation is an appropri-
ate means for asserting public rights and that no taking of private prop-
erty results.
A "Taking" of Development Rights--Can We Go Too Far?
Whether one adopts the viewpoint of a proponent of individual
rights or of public rights, it is evident that in order to preserve a govern-
ment's power to regulate land use while preventing unfairness to an
individual landowner, clarification of the law is necessary. Both judi-
cial and legislative responses are required.
This note proposes the following analytical approach: A legitimate
governmental objective is a prerequisite to a constitutional exercise of
the police power. It logically follows that the public welfare will be
enhanced by an appropriate regulation. It will be presumed that the
legitimate expansion of government power to regulate is consistent with
the public interest. An exception occurs when a regulation lacks a le-
gitimate objective or does not employ a means reasonably related to
that end. This would be an "easy case" for invalidating the regulation.
Similarly, an "easy case" for upholding a regulatory exercise occurs
when a law is reasonably related to the prevention of harm that would
be caused by an individual and when the law achieves its purpose by
enjoining the individual from his harmful activity.
The "tough case" for a regulator, the case which is most likely to
raise a complaint of "unfairness" to an individual, is the situation in
than a fee interest. See also ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE §§ 5-105, 5-106 (1975).
The Code would authorize government acquisition of an interest in land for protection of
environmental values, preservation of historical sites and open spaces, and other purposes.
The power to regulate for these purposes is granted at sections 2-108 and 2-109.
20. See "Fair" Compensation, supra note 18; Hagman, Compensable Regulation." .4 Way of Deal-
ing with WiPeoutsfrom Land Use Controls, 54 J. URBAN L. 45 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Hagman]. Proposals which emphasize the recapture of government "windfalls" to landown-
ers, in conjunction with reform of "wipeout" compensation practices, include: Wexler, Bet-
terment Recovery.- A Financial Proposalfor Sounder Land Use Planning, 3 YALE REV. L.
Soc. Act. 192 (1973); Costonis, Development Rights Transfer." An Exploratory Essay, 83
YALE L.J. 75 (1973). See also Michelman, supra note 15. He recommends "deemphasis of
reliance on judicial action." Id. at 1167. He considers the legislature better able than the
court to administer a "fairness discipline." Id. at 1255. Cf. Durham, 4 Legal and Economic
Basis for City Planning (Making Room for Robert Moses, Wfilliam Zeckendo f, and a City
Planner in the Same Community), 58 COLUM. L. REV. 650 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Dur-
ham]; Elickson, Alternatives to Zoning- Covenants, Nuisance Rules and Fines as Land Use
Controls, 40 U. CHL L. REV. 681 (1937) [hereinafter cited as Elickson]. (Durham and Elick-
son recommend approaches to land use controversies calling for increased use of the
marketplace.)
21. See BOSSELMAN, CALLIES & BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973) [hereinafter cited as Bos-
SELMAN, CALLIES & BANTA]; Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J.
149 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Sax].
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which the government finds it necessary to regulate an innocuous use of
land-a use which would normally be considered socially acceptable-
for a greater public purpose.22
The objectives of a regulatory scheme should be threefold. The
scheme should maximize government power to protect public rights.
At the same time it should minimize the regulation of innocuous pri-
vate activities. Finally, a regulation should provide a remedy to an
individual who is unduly affected by its application. A monetary rem-
edy should be available where the interests of fairness and justice de-
mand that compensation be paid to an individual who suffers special
injury from application of the regulatory scheme.
Legislatures may be characterized as most diligent in pursuing the
first objective noted-the maximization of regulatory power in the pub-
lic interest.23 A practical approach to achieve the three regulatory
objectives noted above requires the proposal of a remedy for individu-
als which may be judicially administered. It will be presumed that the
regulation of innocuous activities is minimized by the implementation
of the individual remedy.
Analytical Framework
Using the factual backdrop of San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City
of San Diego, 4 this note sets forth a method of judicial analysis to
answer the following questions:
I. At what point does a regulatory action become excessive and
effect a taking?
II. What is the nature of the taking?
III. Is compensation required?
IV. Is compensation appropriate where invalidation of the ordinance
is an alternative?
V. If compensation is due, what is the value of the property taken,
and how much compensation should be awarded?25
Supreme Court cases which have addressed the claim of a taking by
regulatory action have squarely answered only the first of these
questions.26
22. See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Euclid held that a law is not rendered
invalid by "the inclusion of a reasonable margin to insure effective enforcement." Id. at 388.
23. See generally note 19 supra.
24. Supra note 5.
25. An ideal compensation strategy would include recapture provisions for windfall. Under cur-
rent law, the recapture of windfall occurs, to a limited extent, when special or general bene-
fits are set off against damages in an eminent domain proceeding. See 27 AM. JUR. 2d
Eminent Domain § 367 (Supp. 1980). The judicial method proposed here would eliminate
some windfall which accrues to "existing users." See note 39 infra. Its emphasis, though, is
to set forth a fair system for compensating those who bear public burdens (who experience a
"wipeout"). Other authors have included methods for windfall recapture in their proposals
for land use regulatory reform. See note 20 supra.
26. The Court's response to these questions is reviewed in Part II of this note infra. See also the
California Supreme Court decision in Agins, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 598 P.2d 25
(1975).
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This note will review basic constitutional policy behind the taking
issue. First, existing case law is reviewed, and tests for a taking defined.
Second, a methodology for answering the five questions presented here
is suggested. Traditional assumptions relating to property rights are
also challenged. A "continuum" of constitutional rights is recognized.
The taking question may involve more than fifth or fourteenth amend-
ment considerations.2 7 Public "property rights" (resources) are broadly
defined. 8 Private rights which have been recognized as compensable
in the past are strengthened in some respects and appear to be dimin-
ished in others.2 9 Property rights which involve more than the physical
possession of land, such as development "expectancies," are increas-
ingly recognized. Other private activities (which may have been
viewed as property rights in the past) must succumb, without compen-
sation, to increased pressure from the public in assertion of rights
which it may have previously possessed but did not enforce.3'
The proposed test attempts to determine whether the plaintiff is be-
ing forced, unfairly, to bear a burden which is far greater than that
borne by the rest of the public. 32 If the burden is too great, the court,
using community standards, determines the extent to which the owner's
intended uses can reasonably be considered to attach to ownership.
These "uses" are intangible property rights. 33 The court awards com-
pensation only to the extent of the value of uses which "attach," how-
ever, and not to the extent of other windfalls which an owner reaps as a
member of the public.34
Potential for Legislative Refinement of the Proposed Judicial Method
The judicial method which will be proposed is ideally suited for
legislative adoption and refinement. Specifically, a legislature could
place the task of determining whether a taking has occurred in the
hands of a local administrative body, which is presumably better quali-
fied than the court to determine questions of an eminent domain char-
27. Neither property rights nor government regulatory powers are absolute. Other liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution must be factored into a determination of their scope. Vari-
ous liberties may weigh in favor of the landowner while others weigh in favor of the public.
It is alleged, for example, that the public has an interest in the protection of wetlands, flood-
plains, open space, and wilderness; under this analysis, it may not be necessary to character-
ize these as property interests. Cf. Sax, supra note 21; (Sax felt that a recognized public
property interest was present in public rights.) But see Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE
L.J. 733 (1974). Reich supports the landowner's interest. He considers liberty and property
interests to be inseparable. See discussion at note 139 infra.
28. See note 132 infra.
29. See note 139 infra.
30. Id.
31. See note 132 infra.
32. See note 82 and text accompanying note 114 infra.
33. See note 139 un/ra.
34. Other authors have suggested legislative solutions which would award "fair compensation"
in amounts less than would traditionally be awarded in an eminent domain proceeding.
Eg., "Fair" Compensation, supra note 18.
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acter. On appeal, the conclusions of the local body should be granted
great deference.
The proposed method of judicial reasoning is intended to provide a
landowner with the minimum amount of compensation that is constitu-
tionally required to counter a taking objection. To minimize judicial
involvement in the regulatory process, a court would invalidate an un-
constitutional ordinance; any reenactment in constitutional form would
be a legislative prerogative.
A legislature might elect to endow its courts with additional options
by which the ordinance could be preserved and compensation awarded.
This would result in greater regulatory flexibility, as well as greater
fairness to the landowner.
PART II
THE TOUGH CASE REVISITED
The "tough case" arises in the following context: a property use is
prohibited by regulation. It may not be clearly harmful, or its harmful
nature may have become known to the public only recently. In addi-
tion, it may have received express government sanction prior to enact-
ment of the regulation in question.3" The use is one which the owner
could reasonably have expected to be permitted to pursue.
Current Law Favors "Existing" Use
If the land was undeveloped at the time the regulation became ef-
fective and if the owner's intended use of the land3 6 is one which was
previously sanctioned, additional unfairness related to his status as an
owner of undeveloped land may result. Commonly, land use regula-
tion is prospective in nature; it may prohibit development but permit
continuation of existing use.37 These practices effectively place the
owner of undeveloped land in a class of persons who are "more regu-
lated." In addition, current judicial tests which determine when a regu-
latory taking occurs augment the difference in treatment. The
regulation of a development expectancy is less likely to be found by the
court to constitute a taking.38
35. Examples might include: construction in a floodplain, wetland, or open space area. For
instances in which no taking was found, despite the fact that a "lawful" prior use was prohib-
ited, see Agins, 100 S. Ct. 2138 (1981), and Rogin, 616 F.2d 680 (3d Cir. 1980); Miller v.
Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
36. See note 42 supra. Similar reasoning would also apply if the owner planned to sell the land
to someone who intended this use.
37. To accomplish its objectives, it limits only future development. See 82 AM. JUR. 2d Zoning
§ 178 (Supp. 1980).
38. In Part II of this paper, the tests which determine whether a taking has occurred will be
discussed. See note 68 infra. Recent cases suggest that the determination may turn, in large
part, upon whether a regulation (which will effectively limit or prohibit development) would
permit continuation of the existing use. The fact that the existing use of the property was not
prohibited received emphasis in Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), for example, and no
taking was found. While these "prospective" regulatory practices might protect the land-
[Vol. 8:278
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Further inequities result from rules regarding compensation which
are unequal in their allocation of both burdens and benefits. First,
when a taking occurs and compensation is awarded, the owner may
reap a windfall, equal to the development value of his property, to the
extent that this value is reflected in the fair market value.3 9 However,
to the extent that regulation affecting undeveloped land fails to trigger
the taking provision, this windfall will not accrue. Furthermore, be-
cause an owner may be deprived, without compensation, of some rea-
sonable uses of his property,' he may be burdened to the extent of that
deprivation.
It might be argued that no constitutionally protected property right
inheres in the right to develop.4 This rule would require an alternative
to the market value approach to compensation, which awards an owner
the value of intangible expectancies to the extent that they are reflected
in the fair market value of the property.42 Under the alternative ap-
proach, the owner of developed property would receive an amount
equal to the value of the property, if its use were limited according to
its current zoning classification (the "existing use level"). He would no
longer receive a windfall for prospective upzoning to a more profitable
use level. This is only a partial solution, however. The owner would
continue to reap a windfall for his fortuitous prior development (now
an "existing use"), absent a government attempt to recoup the value of
that development.
In other words, current law rewards "development" in a manner
consistent with governmental views as to acceptable land use as of the
time that the development occurs. Values which attach to that use be-
owner in the existing use of his land (but not the "future use"), he is not necessarily protected
in the existing use. See Miller, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Goldblatt, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
39. Because, in an eminent domain exercise, the owner receives an amount equal to the value of
the land for its "highest and best use under existing or reasonablyprobable land use controls,"
if upzoning is likely, he will receive a windfall. See "Fair" Compensation, supra note 18, at
1043. On the other hand, the award will not be discounted for prospective downzoning, even
though the downzoning is reasonable and legitimate. Id. at 1044. In no instance is the own-
er entitled to an award which reflects the value in an unregulated state. Id. at 1043. See also
United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 399 U.S. 121 (1950).
40. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 139 (J. Rehnquist, dissenting).
41. A windfall recapture/wipeout mitigation proposal may, for example, provide that there is no
right to develop at levels which exceed the existing zoning classification. The government
may subsequently sell or exchange rights to develop in excess of this level for an agreement to
restrain developmenta a nother location (for example, an historic site). See, e.g., Costonis,
The Chicago: Plan Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of Urban Landmarks, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 574 (1972). This approach which sets an "ownership" threshhold at the existing zoning
classication is not substantially less objectionableh th those which are unfair at an existinguse lev, It is necessary to ask if the public healt , safety, morals, or gener l welfare is
benefited by a height restriction which may be "confiscated" by the government and ex-changed for n alternative police power objective, van Aistyne notes that governmental
asset enhancement is an impermissible objective of the police power. Van Alstyne, supra
note 15, at 23.
42. A "market value" award in an eminent domain proceeding would include the value of "an-
ticipated uses" to the extent that a hypothetical purchaser would pay an amount which re-flects his development expectancies. rn effect, the owner would be receiving a windfall for
the "sale" of the development rights to the extent they are reflected in the market value.
19811
Journal of Legislation
come the property of the owner, although he technically possesses no
more right to develop than does the owner of an undeveloped plot.
This unequal treatment might pass constitutional muster,43 yet it
seems unfair. Courts may have inadvertently characterized develop-
ment interests as too speculative for compensation and thus overlooked
the resulting unfairness. Yet, land use restriction may severely limit the
profit potential of an undeveloped tract of land, and the loss of antici-
pated profits may be very real to the owner of the undeveloped land.
The owner will be injured, and, while the injury is not tangible, it is
measurable. The loss will be reflected in the amount of money paid for
the property and in his investment decisions during the period of own-
ership. When reflected in the market value, the loss of anticipated
profits would be realized if a compensable taking were found. The loss
is, therefore, not too speculative to merit compensation.
The Supreme Court has indicated that it will consider "reasonable
investment expectations" in its determination of whether a taking has
occurred. 44 The extent to which a court will consider development ex-
pectancies will determine how far it intends to go in remedying this
unfairness. Compensable rights in property should inhere regardless of
whether or not a structure has been built upon the land and whether or
not it is "existing" when a regulation is enacted.
The "Tough Case"-A Specific Example-San Diego Gas & Electric
Company v. City of San Diego
In 1966 the San Diego Gas & Electric Company assembled a 412-
acre parcel of undeveloped property as the intended site for a nuclear
power facility. 45 The company alleged that a "course of regulatory
conduct" by the city of San Diego had effected a taking of approxi-
mately 200 acres of the parcel.46 The conduct included the city's efforts
to implement an open-space plan and "downzoning," which accompa-
nied planning activities.47 The case presented the issue: Does a taking
by regulatory action give rise to an inverse condemnation cause of ac-
tion, that is, a suit for damages? 4
The property that was the subject of the suit is lowland, poorly
43. See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
44. Agins, 100 S. Ct. at 2142. See note 138 infra.
45. See Brief for Appellant at 5 (obtained from Louis E. Gobel, San Diego, Cal.), San Diego
Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 1287 (1981). The brief for Appellant
indicated that property was purchased as the future site for a power plant. The brief for
Appellee specified that a nuclear facility was contemplated. Brief for Appellee at 34 (ob-
tained from C. Alan Sumption, San Diego, Cal.), San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San
Diego, 101 S. Ct. 1287 (1981).
46. Brief for Appellant at 16.
47. See id. at 7.
48. Id. at 17. The California Supreme Court in Agins, 24 Cal.3d 266, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 598
P.2d 25 (1975), held that the sole remedy for a taking of this sort is injunction or mandamus.
The United States Supreme Court did not answer the question. See Agins, 447 U.S. 255
(1980).
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drained and sparsely vegetated.49 It consists of tidal flats and marsh-
land, some of it subject to tidal action.5" According to the city, three to
four feet of landfill would have been required to adapt it to the com-
pany's proposed industrial use.5
At the time of purchase, approximately 120 acres of the subject
property was zoned for industrial use, and the remainder was classified
primarily agricultural or holding zone.52 The city was aware of the
owner's intended future use. This use was apparently consistent with
current regulations and policy.53
In 1972, approximately fifty acres of the property zoned for indus-
trial or residential use were downzoned to an agricultural or holding
zone. 54 In addition, the city began to prepare an open space land use
plan, which, at different stages of formulation, affected approximately
100 to 200 acres of the subject property." During 1972 and 1973, the
city conducted a series of hearings on the proposed open space plan.56
Voters subsequently rejected a referendum proposal to purchase some
of the Company's property for a public park reserve. 7 The property
retained its "open space" designation in the General Plan, however.58
The Company filed this lawsuit in 1973. It alleged that the city's
"policy of requiring consistency between the actual use and develop-
ment . . . and the . . . General Plan" precluded industrial use.59
The trial court found that the "continuing course of conduct of the
defendant city. . . in particular, the designation of substantially all of
the subject property as open space. . . [deprived plaintiff] of all practi-
cal, beneficial or economic use of the . . . property. '60 The court or-
dered an award in excess of $3 million.6 ' The court of appeals
affirmed.62 The California Supreme Court, however, having recently
y ,~63 thdecided Agins v. City of Tiburon, remanded the case to the court of
appeals for "reconsideration."'  The United States Supreme Court was
presented with the second court of appeals opinion, which held that a
party's remedy for arbitrary unconstitutional exercise of the police
power that effects a taking is administrative mandamus; compensation
49. Brief for Appellant at 5.
50. Brief for Appellee at 5.
51. Id. at 16.
52. Brief for Appellant at 6.
53. See id. at 5; in 1967 the city's General Plan designated most of the subject property "for
industrial use and. . . 'future growth."' Id. at 6.
54. Brief for Appellee at 7.
55. Id. at 8-11.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 9.
58. Id. at 10, 11.
59. Brief for Appellant at 13.
60. Id. at 14, citing Finding of Fact 29.
61. San Diego, 101 S. Ct. at 1291.
62. Id.
63. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 598 P.2d 25 (1975).
64. San Diego, 101 S. Ct. at 1291.
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is "not required."65 The court found that it did not have jurisdiction
because the California ruling was not a final judgment for purposes of
review.66 It did not reverse the holding of the California court with
respect to the remedy for a taking of property by overzealous
regulation.
Much of the present controversy regarding land use control, as it
effects a taking of property, has resulted from confusion about the ap-
propriate test for determining the constitutional issues.67 For example,
the court may assess the constitutionality of the exercise of the police
power.68 As part of this determination, or in a separate analysis, it may
review claims that a taking occurred. 69 Then, the question presented in
San Diego71 may confront the court: Is the taking which results when
"regulation goes too far" one which requires compensation? 7'
Where invalidation is available as an alternative remedy, the court
assumes a legislative role. The court must decide the extent to which it
should become involved in effecting a "taking with compensation" (by
awarding compensation and preserving the ordinance). The scope ofjudicial involvement has not been defined by courts or legislatures,
however.72 If compensation is due, the amount owed comes into con-
troversy, and the court is again required to set forth a standard which
could greatly affect land use policy-making.
The "Test" as Defined by the Cases
Few cases presenting these questions have reached the Supreme
Court. The test which defines the bounds within which a legislature
must act remains ill-defined.73  The factors to be considered and the
weight to be given them in determining the constitutionality of the ex-
65. Id. at 1292.
66. See note 10 supra.
67. For example, the "physical invasion," "diminution of value," "balancing," or "prevention of
harm" (nuisance) test. A good discussion and critique is presented by Michelman, supra
note 15, at 1183-201.
68. See notes 90 & 107 infra.
69. See notes 90-93 infra.
70. 101 S. Ct. 1287 (1981).
71. Where the Supreme Court has awarded compensation, the factual contexts presented to date
would support a determination that a "physical invasion" occurred, or that the unconstitu-
tional exercise could not be remedied by invalidation. (This might also be considered a
physical invasion.) For example, in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), the
Court found a property right in the right to exclude others from a lagoon area which was
dredged and filled by te owner to create a marina. The marina was "taken" by the govern-
ment as a navigable waterway. Even Kaiser Aetna appeared to hold that the government
might have an option of "regulating" the waters, but not 'sing" the property for a public
aquatic park; the exercise would cease to require compensation. Id. at 172-73. Other "physi-
cal invasion" cases include: United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); United States v.
Dickinson, 331 U.S. 799 (1950); United States v. Kansas City Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950);
Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962). Interference with an existing use is more
easily classified a physical invasion, than is interference with development rights. See ineq-
uities discussed in text accompanying notes 36-44 supra.
72. See Van Alstyne, supra note 15, at 72.
73. Infra notes 119 & 122.
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ercise have not been consistently stated.74
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon set forth the test for a taking by excess
regulation by stating that "if regulation goes too far, it will be recog-
nized as a taking."75 The exercise was found to be unconstitutional. It
is notable that compensation was not awarded, however, because a
claim for compensation was not presented.
In 1926, four years after the decision in Pennsylvania Coal, a case
involving the constitutionality of a municipal zoning ordinance came
before the Supreme Court. In Euclid v. Ambler Co., the Court held that
this form of land use regulation was constitutional, unless "clearly arbi-
trary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare."76 The fact that zoning has as
its objective the control of activities which might cause a nuisance was
emphasized. The regulation of innocuous activities was upheld as
within a "reasonable margin" necessary to ensure effective enforce-
ment.77 The Court did not mention the rule in Pennsylvania Coal.
In Goldblatt v. Hempstead, the Court considered an ordinance regu-
lating dredging and pit excavation. It held that the taking question is
not raised where the regulation is enacted to prevent a noxious use.7 8
In dicta, however, the Court seemed to accept the possibility that the
Pennsylvania Coal test might apply to the regulation of a harmful activ-
ity where evidence of a reduction in property value is presented.
Then, in 1978, the Court was presented with a claim that the appli-
cation of a historic landmark law to Penn Central Terminal in New
York City was a taking of the owner's property and that compensation
was due.79 The Court held that no taking had occurred. It based its
holding on a finding that (1) the action bore a substantial relation to
promotion of the general welfare and (2) the plaintiff was permitted a
"reasonable beneficial use" of the property. 0
The Court went further, however, and discussed in detail the rule
74. See the Court's summary of these factors in Penn Central, text accompanying notes 83-84
infra.
75. 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922). See note 15 supra. The owner of subsurface mining rights chal-
lenged a statute which, in effect, denied him all use of his property. In his opinion, Justice
Holmes held that there is a limit to the exercise of police power beyond which point it be-
comes a "taking." This limit was required in order to give meaning to the contract and due
process clauses of the Constitution. Id. at 413, 414. In his analysis, Justice Holmes weighed
the public interest in the regulation and found it to be insufficient. His methodology may be
better characterized as a balancing test, although he spoke of the point at which an exercise
of the police power might cause private property to "disappear." Id. at 415, 416. It is this
concern about "disappearance" that has probably stimulated the diminished value test and
suggested a "continuum" approach to the question of a taking. See text accompanying note
90 infra.
76. Euclid, 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
77. Id. at 388.
78. 369 U.S. 590 (1962). The Court asks the following: (1) Does the public interest "require
such interference?"; (2) Are the means reasonably necessary for accomplishing the pur-
pose?; and (3) Are they unduly oppressive upon the individual? Id. at 595. See also "the
easy case" discussed in Part I supra.
79. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
80. Id. at 138.
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of law which is to be applied when a regulation is claimed to have
effected a taking. The constitutional guarantee against a taking pre-
vents the government from placing upon an individual burdens that "in
allfairness andjustice should be borne by the public as a whole."'" The
Court asks whether an interference with a right is "of such a magni-
tude" that compensation is required.12  Unable to develop "any set
formula" and relying "largely upon the circumstances [in that] case,"
the Court identified factors which are significant in its analysis.83 One
of these factors is whether the existing use of the property is
prohibited. 4
Both San Diego" and Agins s presented the taking issue in the con-
text of land downzoned pursuant to a state legislative mandate for local
open space plans. The regulations restricted future development, not
existing uses. The validity of open space regulation had never been
before the Supreme Court. In Agins, legislation passed the constitu-
tional tests which were applied. It "substantially advance[s] legitimate
governmental goals."8" It did not deny the owner "the best use of [his]
land,"88 and a balancing test weighed in favor of the public interest.8 9
81. Id. at 123 (emphasis added). See also Agins, 447 U.S. 255, 256 (1980). The focus in Penn
Central is on a finding of "reasonable beneficial use," and economic factors receive emphasis
in the discussion. 438 U.S. at 138. A review of the Court's method of reasoning, however,
suggests that the test to be applied has greater breadth than the end result might suggest. See
discussion in note 126 infra.
82. 438 U.S. at 136.
83. Id. at 124. Most important is the Court's emphasis on the basic test--one of fairness. Id. at
123. "Factors" in the analysis are mere components of a test which will determine the basic
constitutional issue. See Part III infra. These factors include "the economic impact of the
regulations on the claimant, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations, and whether the character of the governmental action can
be characterized as a physical invasion." Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
84. See id. at 136. The Court first noted that regulations have been upheld despite the fact that
an existing use is prohibited. Miller and Goldblatt were among the cases cited. See Penn
Central, 438 U.S. at 126-27. Later in the opinion, however, the Court indicated that the law
challenged by the plaintiff, Penn Central, did not interfere with the existing use of the terminal,
andfor that reason, did not interfere with Penn Central's 'rimary expectation concerning the
use" (emphasis added). It did not prevent Penn Central terminal from obtaining a "reason-
able return on its investment." 438 U.S. at 136. The Court's methodology in Penn Central
may be consistent with a view that there is only apresumption that the existing use comports
with "expectation" and that a "reasonable return" is not necessarily a reasonable return in the
economic context. Reasonable return is, instead, related to the owner's reasonable expecta-
tions, but these expectations may include socially induced exfpectations, as well as investment-
backed expectations. This determination invokes an objective standard relating to the "fore-
seeability" of regulation. See notes 130 & 137 infra.
85. 101 S. Ct. 1287 (1981).
86. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
87. Id. at 260.
88. Id. at 262.
89. See id. The Court has applied the traditional test for validity of a zoning ordinance; open
space regulation is clearly within the "zoning power." The Court linked a determination that
"a fundamental attribute of ownership" was not extinguished where owners "are free to
pursue their reasonable investment expectations" to the question of whether "justice and
fairness" had been denied. Id. See discussion of Penn Central in text accompanying notes
70-79 supra. See also Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. 164 (1980).
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The Scholars' Interpretation
Legal scholars have attempted to identify the rules of law set forth
in Pennsylvania Coal and the cases which followed. One view is that
the range of regulation, from a valid police power exercise to a "tak-
ing," is a "continuum" and that compensation requirements are trig-
gered when the taking occurs.' Under this view, a "taking" with just
compensation begins to take on the appearance of a constitutional
right. By going "too far," the government enters a new realm of its
regulatory authority, one where compensation is required to validate
an exercise.
Under a second view, compensation is not required for regulatory
action which results in a "taking." A "taking" in this context is merely
an unconstitutional exercise of power, and the appropriate remedy is
mandamus or injunction.9
Other views, consistent in basic theory with the second, provide an
alternative. The legislative body is given the option of accepting invali-
dation of the unconstitutional regulation by the court or of paying com-
pensation in order to convert the exercise into a valid taking.92
A view which is contrary to the continuum approach (discussed
first) regards the police power as an "umbrella" encompassing the
power of eminent domain. A taking by eminent domain is thus viewed
as a means to an end-compensation legitimizes an otherwise unconsti-
tutional exercise of the police power.93
PART III
PROPOSED METHOD OF JUDICIAL REASONING
FOR SAN DIEGO
The Court, in dicta in Penn Central and Agins, did not define the
level of compensation required to rectify a taking by regulatory action.
The dissenting opinion in San Diego indicated that compensation may
be required if a taking is established.94
90. In support of a construction of the taking clause which would constitutionally require com-
pensation, see Beuschler, Some Tentative Notes on the Integration ofPolice Power and Emi-
nent Domain by the Courts.- So-Called Inverse or Reverse Condemnation, I URBAN L. ANN. 1
(1968); see also Durham, sufpra note 20. (The "continuum" from police power to eminent
domain should be distinguished from the "Constitutional continuum" suggested in note 25
supra.) See also the dissenting opinion in San Diego, 101 S. Ct. at 1296.
91. See Note, Inverse Condemnation, Its Availabili in Challenging the Validity ofa Zoning Ordi-
nance. 26 STAN. L. REV. 1439 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Note]. See the discussion of Agins
in the San Diego dissent, 101 S. Ct. at 1296.
92. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 15, at 1169. Michelman rejected an approach which fo-
cused attention on distinguishing police power from eminent domain. He characterized the
issue as a broader question: "When a social decision to redirect economic resources entails
painfully obvious opportunity costs, how shall these costs be distributed?" Id.
93. "Fair" Compensation, supra note 18, at 1037. The Court's rationale in KaiserAetna, 444 U.S.
164 (1979), is consistent with this approach to the question. See note 71 supra.
94. The dissent, drafted by Justice Brennan, stated that "in my view" the government must pay
compensation "once a court establishes that there was a regulatory 'taking."' See San Di-
ego, 101 S. Ct. 1287, 1304 (1981) (J. Brennan, dissenting). Justice Brennan was joined by
three Justices in dissent.
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The dissenting opinion further suggested that a court does not have
the power to invalidate an ordinance, when a remedy for a "taking of
property is sought." '95 While recommending invalidation as a means of
converting a "permanent" taking into a temporary one, the dissent in-
dicated that is the responsibility of the legislative body, not the courts
to formulate the option.
The San Diego dissent did not discuss Kaiser Aetna v. United
States,96 a recent case involving federal regulatory action taken pursu-
ant to the commerce power. In that case the Court ruled that a regula-
tion authorizing public use of a marina constructed by the plaintiff
effected a taking of private property in violation of the fifth amend-
ment. Compensation was awarded. Two factors may distinguish Kai-
ser Aetna from San Diego and other cases. First, the taking resulted
from a congressional exercise of the commerce power. It may be that
the Court will more easily award compensation in this scenario, that is,
when a taking results from federal governmental action. Second, Kai-
ser Aetna presented a "taking" which for all practical purposes could
not be reversed by invalidation of the regulation. This can be distin-
guished from a taking by regulatory interference where invalidation of
the ordinance provides a remedy other than compensation.97
Because the dissenting Justices in San Diego rejected the view that
invalidation may serve as a remedy for a taking,98 their failure to sup-
port an argument for monetary compensation by reference to Kaiser
Aetna is worthy of note.
Before the question of compensation is addressed, the court must
first determine whether a taking has occurred.9 9 Recalling both the
"continuum" of constitutional rights previously suggestedI and the
many "factors" which must be considered,' it is clear that the test set
forth in the case law has been obscured by the "particular circum-
stances" of a given case 02 and by the constitutional issues which the
particular facts raise. With a view to both case law and policy interests,
the method which follows will serve to distinguish the factors in the
analysis from any basic constitutional "test." In a similar vein, this
method will sever interests which are not property interests from the
analysis. 10 3
95. Notably, the dissent discussed "the government's power to rescind or amend the regulation."
Whether rescission by the government occurred is a question of fact. See San Diego, 101 S.
Ct. at 1305 (emphasis added). A temporary taking terminates "on the date that [tlhe govern-
ment entity chooses to rescind or otherwise amend the regulation." Id. at 1304.
96. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
97. Id.
98. 101 S. Ct. at 1304-05.
99. See notes 129-31 & 138 infra.
100. See text at note 25 supra.
101. See text at notes 83-85 supra.
102. See, e.g., Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
103. For example, noxious uses. See discussion at note 109 infra. The Court in Penn Central did
not modify the "rule" that some activities are outside the realm of economic interests which
require compensation if taken. See, e.g., Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125-27.
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The proposed method can serve two functions. First, with respect
to the landowner, the method attempts to cause a return to basic consti-
tutional principles of fairness and due process. Second, it attempts to
maximize government power to regulate in the public interest.' °
Judicial Methodology
I. Has the landowner been deprived of substantial due process, result-
ing in a taking of his property in violation of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments?
A. Does the exercise bear "no substantive relation to the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare?"' 1 5
1. The ordinance may be required to bear only a "'rational rela-
tionship" to a legitimate state interest. 106
B. Was he deprived of the reasonable beneficial use of his
property? 107
1. Was "property" taken?'0
a. Noxious use is not a property right.1°9
b. In other respects, an expanded concept of property
rights, on the part of the landowner, is recognized."I0
i. Property includes reasonable investment-backed ex-
pectations."' It includes the "essential stick" in a bundle of rights.!12
C. Is the burden one which 'n all fairness and ]ustice should be
borne by the public as a whole?"" 3
104. See discussion in Part I supra. While this note presumes the maximization of government
power to be one objective, proponents of a market approach to the taking issue would have
government involvement minimized. See, e.g., Elickson, supra note 20, Durham, supra note
20. On the other hand, if public rights are presumed to be cognizable interests, regulation for
their protection should not be viewed as interference with private interests.
105. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395 (emphasis added).
106. Rogin, 616 F.2d at 689. The court noted that the test for substantive due process is now
similar to that for equal protection analysis. A rational relationship must be found. Cf.
Euclid, 272 U.S. at 390 (the Court suggested a "without substantial relation" standard). See
discussion at note 76 supra and Rogin, 616 F.2d at 688.
107. See note 80 supra. One question is whether the court asks first: "Is the exercise of power
unconstitutional?" (and then concludes that a taking has occurred as a result of the unlawful
exercise); or whether it asks: "Did a taking occur without just compensation?" (thereby mak-
ing the exercise of power unconstitutional). It appears that the Supreme Court looks at the
issue from both perspectives. See Agins, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). The court looks first for a
"substantial relationship." Id. at 260, 261. It then considers the extent to which the plaintiff
has been denied the "economically viable use" of his property. Id. Either may determine
the substantive due process issue. See also Rogins, 616 F.2d 680 (3d Cir. 1980).
108. In Kairer Aetna, 444 U.S. at 178, the Court defined a property right as one which "has the
law back of it"; it is an "essential stick" in the bundle of rights which may be characterized as
property. Id. at 176. See also United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
Michelman suggests the following definition: "the pattern of behavioral assumptions and
ethical values which have come to be associated with institutions dictating some degree of
permanent distribution." Michelman, supra note 15, at 1023.
109. See Goldblatt, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
110. An expanded concept of property rights on the part of the landowner is suggested with re-
spect to rights which relate to his status. See notes 127 & 138 infra. Expanded views of
public rights may have more weight, however, on balance. See notes 116 & 132 infra.
111. SeeAgins, 447 U.S. at 262; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136.
112. See note 108 supra.
113. See note 81 supra (emphasis added).
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1. The question "who should bear the burden" includes the
above determination as to "what is property" and whether it was
taken. " 4
2. Property rights and other constitutional rights of the public
might be involved in the determination and weighed against the rights
of the landowner."I5
II. What is the "character" of the taking? (A taking by regulatory
action may be distinguished from a physical invasion.)" 6
A. It may not be necessary to answer this question, except to dis-
tinguish "takings" which can be made temporary by enjoining the reg-
ulatory action." 17
III. If the ordinance is invalid, is the court required to award
compensation?
A. Compensation is not required if the regulatory action can be
enjoined and no taking occurs.
B. If a "temporary taking" occurs while the regulation is in force,
compensation should be awarded. The temporary taking is not unlike
one which would be considered a "physical invasion" and compensa-
tion is due.' 19
IV. Should compensation be awarded where invalidation is an alter-
114. See note 108 supra. First, harmful activities are considered not to be "property" and are
eliminated from the analysis. See text at note 109 supra. The court then "balances" the
extent to which the plaintiff has been deprived of the reasonable use of his property (dimin-
ished value) against the extent to which the public, and the landowner as a member of the
public, will benefit from the regulation, in effect balancing wipeouts against any windfalls
from "general benefits." Traditional "windfall recapture" only considers special benefits,
supra note 25. This "formula" is consistent, for the most part, with tests which have been set
forth in the cases, as well as with the interests of fairness and justice to the plaintiff.
115. An early view seems to have presumed the existence of a universe of private property rights.
It was reasoned that an individual's private space was invaded when a nuisance activity oc-
curred. Van Alstyne has noted that an exercise of police power could be supported without
compensation because of the reciprocal benefits that a regulated property owner received.
Van Alstyne, supra note 15, at 5. Subsequent case law has been more flexible in authorizing
regulation in the public interest. See id. Sax and Bosselman are recognized for their ex-
panded views of public rights. See note 21 supra. It is suggested that a new concept of
"public rights" is needed, one that is broader than that proposed by Sax or Bosselman. Both
the right to public "property" (ie., public resources) and certain public "liberties" would be
included. In addition, to the extent that these liberties can be considered "fundamental"-
that is, if they are balanced against "mere" economic interests on the part of the landowner-
they would be favored in any assessment of the constitutionality of a regulation which pro-
tects them. For an example of the Court's consideration of a regulation affecting only an
"economic" interest, see Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976). See generally note 27 and accompany-
ing text supra.
116. See note 71 supra.
117. Property is considered as a unit which includes both the physical component and associated
rights. Supra note 108. But see text accompanying note 85 supra.
118. See Goldblatt, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
119. See the California Supreme Court decision in Agins, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 598
P.2d 25 (1975). Note, supra note 91. See also Brief for Appellant at 36, San Diego Gas &
Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 1287 (1981). The exercise of the power of eminent
domain (and the payment of any compensation) is not a constitutional right; it is merely a
means to an end. It is a factor which, when present, can prevent a right from being violated.
See "Fair" Compensation, supra note 18, at 1037.
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native, that is, should compensation be awarded for a permanent tak-
ing, where the court could enjoin the action and terminate the taking?
A. Compensation should not be awarded where invalidation is an
alternative. 2 0
B. Where a local authority normally decides whether the power of
eminent domain should be exercised and compensation awarded, the
court may, by legislation, be empowered to give the local entity an "op-
tion." '21 It may decide whether to award compensation and retain title,
or accept invalidation of the ordinance.1
22
V. If compensation is due, what amount should be awarded? 23
A. When a regulation effects a taking, the "property" taken is the
right to use property in a certain way.' 24
1. The extent of government restriction defines the quantity of
"rights" which have been taken.
a. Only those property uses which are restricted can be in-
cluded as "taken."'' 25
b. Only that part of the exercise which is an unreasonable
exercise effects a taking. t
6
120. Compensation should be awarded for the property (the use) taken, for the temporary period.
See also note 123 infra.
121. Policy reasons for not requiring that the court award compensation include the following:
(1) Prevention of chilling effect on government land use regulation;
(2) Deference to legislature in land use matters, and control of financial resources;
and
(3) Impact of large damage awards on government finances.
See Note, supra note 91; Van Alstyne, supra note 15. In addition, the alternative of invali-
dating the ordinance and awarding compensation for only a temporary taking (see note 120
infra) might be viewed as a less restrictive alternative remedy available to the court; the court
should not enter the legislative realm by in effect requiring a purchase of the property in fee.
For example, in San Diego, a proposal to purchase the plaintiffs property by eminent do-
main was rejected by the electorate. See Brief for Appellee at 9, San Diego Gas & Elec. Co.
v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 1287 (1981). Along similar lines, see "Fair" Compensation,
supra note 18. Costonis argues for legislative attention to the compensation question; he
suggests that the "premise" that the police power and eminent domain are correlative has
had its own chilling effect on land use regulation. Id. at 1033. See note 90 supra.
122. See discussion of legislation which grants such an option, supra note 19.
123. A related question is "Should non-monetary compensation be awarded?" It is this author's
opinion that certain fundamental concepts of liberty are associated with the right to a reason-
able use of property. See note 138 infra. The importance of these rights weigh against an
argument for non-monetary compensation unless it is optional.
124. See discussion of "Type II" rights in text accompanying note 129 infra. The purpose of
characterizing the taking as a taking of a "use" is to assist the court in justifying compensa-
tion at an amount less than market value. Infra notes 124 & 125. This characterization is for
purposes of compensation only. The determination of which uses attach as property rights
requires consideration of the property "as a whole." See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131.
125. This is, in effect, a taking, to the extent of the restriction.
126. The "value" of the restriction is limited. The court will compensate only to the extent that the
restriction is "unreasonable. " The award proposed here would equal the market value of the
property subject (only) to "reasonable" regulation; it would reflect the value subject to the
most stringent regulation which would, absent compensation, be constitutionally pemissible.
Traditionally, the value of the "highest and best use" has been awarded. See note 39 supra.
Costonis has suggested that legislatures adopt a similar rationale for compensation. "Fair"
Compensation, supra note 18, at 1048. His legislative recommendation followed his disap-
pointment in the judiciary. Costonis argues that Euclid, 272 U.S. 365 (1926), (which "de-
throned" the "highest and best use" standard for a police power exercise) "could have paved
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2. The determination of the rights which have been taken nec-
essarily involves a determination of what are property rights in this
context. Only those "uses" which attach as property rights should be
compensated 127
a. Five categories of use evolve:
i. Type I-pure physical possession 128 (no spillover 29
effect),
ii. Type II-the right to a reasonable use 30 of public
resources (reasonable spillover) which is corollary to ownership
(compensable),' 3 '
iii. Type III--the right to a reasonable use of resources
(reasonable spillover) in common with other members of the public
which is not corollary (not compensable), 32
iv. Type IV-uses which continue to be permitted (not
barred by the regulation), and
v. Type V-unreasonable uses. 133
B. The method of analysis involves three tiers.
1. There should be a determination of what constitutes a "rea-
sonable use." This standard is applied in determining at what point a
taking occurs. 1 34  It is also the first tier in determining the amount of
compensation due. For the purpose of the latter determination, the
property value of the "use" may be elevated slightly, to the extent that
the court is relieved of obligations to "presume constitutionality" and
to defer to the legislature with regard to the presumption. 3
a. The court will be required to specify a test for this
determination. Factors will be considered in light of objective commu-
nity standards. They include:
i. Reasonable expectancies for development, based
the way" for a judicial role in eminent domain, limiting compensation to the amount neces-
sary to cure the taking objection. Id. at 1043.
127. See property definitions in note 108 supra.
128. See also note 71 supra. To the extent that a person's economic interests are increasingly
defined by his status in society, it becomes less important to distinguish "physical
possession."
129. See note 138 infra. The "spillover" effect of property use is noted. This author does not fully
subscribe to Sax's approach to spillover. Sax places too great an emphasis on the govern-
ment as allocator. The taking question might arise whenever it can be said that a member of
the private sector has a right to use a resource in other than its natural state. Most uses, in
fact, would fall into this category. See Sax, supra note 21.
130. See note 138 infra.
131. See notes 137 & 138 i5fa.
132. These include public rights in public resources as well as other public interests. See note 116
supra. They are not compensable; furthermore, pressure upon these resources, resulting
from growth in both industrialization and population, demands greater assertion of these
rights on the part of the public than may have occurred in the past. By defining certain
resources to be publicly "owned," this note suggests a regulatory perspective somewhat dif-
ferent than a traditional police power analysis. The end result is the same, however. The
approach is similar to the public trust doctrine discussed by BOSSELMAN, CALLIES & BANTA,
supra note 21, at 313. See also Sax, supra note 21.
133. For examples of noxious uses, see note 103 supra.
134. See note 107 supra.
135. See Dukes, 427 U.S. at 303.
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upon existing and foreseeable future land use regulation (reasonable
investment-backed expectations);
ii. Competing interconnected uses of any shared pub-
lic resources136; and
iii. The circumstances of each case.t 37
What is "reasonable" is to be determined from a social perspective,
not an economic perspective. For example, an owner who purchases
floodplain lands which he should know are essential for water conser-
vation and protection of a public water supply has no reasonable in-
vestment-backed expectation to recover what an economist would
define to be a reasonable return. The approach suggested here is sup-
ported by two principles: first, diminished value action alone is not a
taking; and second, regulation for the prevention of harm does not ef-
fect a taking.' 3
8
2. A determination of whether the "uses" which have been
taken are compensable property rights is required. Types I and II uses
are compensable. Type III reasonable uses are shared public rights and
are not compensable. The second tier requires separation of these uses.
a. Economic interests are increasingly defined by one's sta-
tus in society, that is, the value of property reflects its institutional set-
ting. ' 39 The regulatory setting is one component. Consistent with this
trend, this note proposes increased recognition of Type II property
rights as compensable if taken, regardless of whether Type I rights are
taken.
136. See Sax, supra note 21.
137. See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
138. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). A better approach might be a legislative solution,
such as that proposed by Costonis. He asks what a "reasonable rate of return" should be and
recommends legislative standards which codify the criteria that recur in land use decisions.
These "reasonable beneficial use rates" are heavily interlaced in community standards (cul-
tural plus technical). He suggests that the net result would be only a modest increase in
compensation. "Fair" Compensation, supra note 18, at 1053.
139. For example, Reich objects to a classification of property rights and liberty rights as "separa-
ble." He argues for greater recognition of a private right to use property (even if the use is
"unreasonable"). Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733-74 (1964). He rejects the view
that the majority (public) interest should define the scope of private rights. He is concerned
with government largess (including government regulatory power-permit power, profes-
sional licensing, and public resources control). Government manipulation of its largess can
define an individual's status in society in a variety of ways and determine his right to receive
income. See id. at 739. Reich recognizes that this largess is notnecessarily property. Id. at
735. It can be taken away if a legitimate public policy is served. Id. at 774. He argues,
however, for the creation of private rights in the largess; he sees no likelihood of retreat from
the public interest state, yet rights in the largess have become an increasingly important form
of wealth. See id. at 778. Reich's opinion is consistent with two ideas which are presented in
this note:
(1) the concepts of liberty and property are not separable, and
(2) uses of property which are regulated in the public interest are not necessarily property
but at some point they take on the character of property; they become a right in the eyes
of the community.
A qualitative difference exists between Reich's suggestions and the expanded notion of the
public domain presented at note 115 spra. The latter would effectuate, in a sense, a "reduc-
tion" in the "private rights" which are recognizable as property rights. This suggestion is not
inconsistent with Reich's opinion that majority interest should not rule. It rejects, however,
his apparent characterization of "reasonable use" as one which benefits the majority.
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b. The concurrent recognition of public rights-Type III
rights-will counterbalance greater recognition of Type II rights.
3. The extent of the governmental restriction should be deter-
mined. Property rights are "taken" only to the extent they are unrea-
sonably restricted. At the third tier the temporary or permanent
character of the restriction and the extent to which it is unreasonable
are determined.
Summary of Method of Reasoning
Type I and Type II uses are property rights, and compensation
should be awarded if they are taken temporarily or permanently. (It is
not necessary to separate these uses in calculating compensation due).
Type III and Type IV uses are not property rights. No compensa-
tion should be awarded for any part of the "market value" which re-
flects these uses.
Type V uses are also not compensable. They are subtracted when
all but the "restricted" uses are excluded.
The court will first determine whether the exercise is constitutional.
The focus, where a "taking" question is raised, is whether an individual
landowner should, in fairness and justice, bear the burden of a regula-
tion which serves a legitimate public purpose. This question is reduced
to whether the owner has been deprived of a reasonable use of his prop-
erty and whether that use is one that is corollary to ownership (one that
is a compensable property right). Unreasonable uses are not property
and are not considered in the determination.
If the court determines that a taking of property by regulatory ac-
tion has occurred, it must determine the amount of compensation due.
Uses which are not restricted by the regulation are not among those
taken. Similarly, uses subject to "reasonable regulation" (regulation
which would be permitted without compensation) are not among those
taken. Only that part of the regulation which is an unreasonable exer-
cise effects a taking. This might be labelled a taking of property valued
at its "highest and best use," subject to the most severe level of regula-
tion which could be reasonably, constitutionally applied.
Simply stated, the amount of compensation due is equal to the
value ofproperty rights restricted by unreasonable regulation.
Federal Statutory Remedies in Damages
The federal statutory remedy for deprivation of a constitutional
right, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, authorizes both injunctive and monetary re-
lief. '40 Following the rationale above for a judicial remedy absent this
statutory provision, damages in an amount less than the fair market
value of the property would be justified under section 1983.' 4'
140. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
141. The Fifth Circuit attempted to apply the rule in San Diego, Agins, and Penn Central to a
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PART IV
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in San Diego had an opportunity to clarify the
test for determining when a regulation effects a taking in violation of
the fifth or fourteenth amendment and to decide whether compensation
is constitutionally required. If the California court returns a final judg-
ment in San Diego that is consistent with its ruling in Agins, it will
answer the taking claim by enjoining operation of the ordinance.
In a case similar to San Diego, the Supreme Court is likely to be
asked whether compensation is required or whether it is ever a remedy.
The Court may decide these questions in a manner which reflects mod-
em economic realities. It should award compensation to owners who
have been actually deprived of property, whether by a physical taking
or an intangible deprivation of a reasonable use. A chilling effect on
governmental regulation will be minimized if the Court sets forth a test
which will provide "fair and just compensation" at a level which does
not exceed the amount necessary to remedy the taking objection. If
possible, the Court should enjoin the operation of an invalid ordinance
and order compensation only for the temporary period during which it
is effective.
If the Supreme Court has another opportunity to address these is-
sues, it may do more than award compensation. It may indicate to
local governing bodies that a legislative option is open to them. They
may provide limited compensation for landowners unduly affected by a
particular land use regulation in an amount which would satisfy a po-
tential taking objection. The local government may implement legisla-
tion that gives the court the option to exercise the power of eminent
domain to effect a permanent taking with compensation after a trial in
which the ordinance is declared unconstitutional. With this option, the
local body could elect to purchase the property right associated with
the desired use restriction, thereby avoiding invalidation of the ordi-
nance by the Court.
The Court may elect to combine any recommendations with notice
that it intends to continue its deference to legislative judgment. Where
constitutional rights are violated, however, it will remedy the wrong,
but in so doing, the Court will select methods that minimize judicial
assumption of traditionally legislative functions. It will enjoin the gov-
ernment exercise and award damages for any temporary taking which
section 1983 action in Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 693 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1981). The
court held that an action for damages would lie under section 1983 when "property is taken
for public use without just compensation by a municipality through a zoning regulation that
denies an owner any economically viable use, thereof." Id. at 1200. In Hernandez, the al-
leged taking occurred as a result of the city'sfalure to rezone the property. The court stated
that "a taking" does not occur until the ... governing body is given a reasonable time...
to review its zoning legislation. . . and to correct the inequity." Id. (emphasis added). "The
measure of damages. . . will be an amount equal to just compensation for the value of the
property during the period of the taking." Id.
1981]
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occurred prior to invalidation. In so doing, the Court will provide a
remedy to injured property owners. At the same time, however, it will
perhaps chill the regulation of innocuous activities. If legislaturesfail
to define judicial options and increase the flexibility of judicial reme-
dies, legislative policy interests, including limitation of regulatory
power, may suffer severely. To achieve model regulatory objectives,
the proposed judicial remedy, which responds only to constitutional re-
quirements, should be coupled with legislative responses which address
a broader range of policy interests.
Carol L. Dorge*
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